Ireland and Brexit - Now What?

Ireland, we were told by Boris Johnson and his coterie ofLeave campaigners, was not a problem. It was a non-issue dreamt up by theRemainers as part of their fear campaign. The Good Friday Agreement, they said,was secure along with the future of the union.

Then Boris drew the EU-UK border down the middle of theIrish Sea and threw Northern Ireland’s Protestants to the nationalist wolves.It was not the first time that a British Prime Minister was prepared tosacrifice Ulster for the benefit of England. During World War Two, WinstonChurchill, offered unification in return for Irish entry into the war on theside of the Allies. Eamon de Valera refused because he thought Churchill wouldbe unable to deliver on the pledge.

This week Sinn Fein—the political wing of the IRA—emerged asone of the victors in a three-way tie in the Irish general election. A unifiedisland was not a major part of their campaign. In fact, it was conspicuous bythe virtual silence on the subject. Instead the nationalists focused on aleft-wing agenda of increased spending on public services and housing incontrast to the long-established 100-year duopoly of the centrist parties FineGael and Fianna Fail.

But make no mistake. A united Ireland free of Britishcontrol remains at the heart and soul of Sinn Fein. It is the reason that itwas formed back in 1905. And pre-World War I support for the nationalist causein the southern two-thirds of the Ireland was the reason that Sir Edward Carsonwas able to mobilise 100,000-plus members of the Ulster Volunteer Force tothreaten a civil war unless the six Protestant-dominated counties of the northremained part of the United Kingdom.

Sinn Fein didn’t stay at the top of Eire’s political ladderfor long. After the 1922-23 civil war, Eamon de Valera split the party and tookmost of its membership into the newly-formed Fianna Fail. For the next twentyyears, Sinn Fein didn’t bother to contest any seats for the Dail. It graduallycame back after the war by linking itself to the IRA as its political wing, butunder Gerry Adams it shifted to concentrate more on the ballot box then thebomb and the gun. The end result was the Good Friday Agreement in April 1998.

The Agreement left the issue of the future sovereignty ambiguouslyopen-ended. For the time being, it was recognised that the majority in NorthernIreland wanted to remain part of the UK while at the same accepting that amajority on the island of Ireland wanted unification.  In a sort of constructive confusion, it wasagreed that both views were legitimate and would—for the time being—representthe basis of a working arrangement. However, if a majority of the people inboth Northern Ireland and Eire decided otherwise than the British and Irishgovernments are under a “binding obligation” to implement that choice.

The received wisdom of the time was that the this“constructive ambiguity” had kicked the issue of unification into the longgrass and, at best, the two halves of the island would gradually—over many,many years–  move closer in a yetundetermined fashion;  possibly under theprotection of the over-arching umbrella of joint membership of the EU. Thencame Brexit. Northern Ireland voted 56 percent to 44 percent to remain. But itwas part of the United Kingdom which voted narrowly to leave. Sinn Feinimmediately called for a referendum on unification. An opinion poll for theIrish Times showed a narrow majority in favour. More surprisingly, five percentof the unionists polled said they would support reunification; a small butsignificant number. The pollsters and Sinn Fein were ignored by Westminster.

But Boris Johnson’s government cannot ignore the views ofthe Irish government which is a co-signatory to the Good Friday Agreement. AndSinn Fein’s success in this week’s elections raises the real possibility thatcoalition talks could result in the nationalist party being part of the Eiregovernment. If not this time, then quite possibly sometime in the near future.

If that happens than Sinn Fein President Mary Lou McDonaldhas made it clear that the price of her support is a referendum on a unitedIreland “within five years.” Furthermore, that she will call for Brussels tosupport unification in the same way that the EU supported German reunificationand is demanding the reunification of the island of Cyprus. 

A vote on reunification appears to be bouncing back from thelong grass, and in doing so raises a host of other questions. How canWestminster ignore the Scottish National Party’s demands for a secondreferendum if it allows a border poll in Northern Ireland? And, what will bethe reaction of the Ulstermen of the north? They have proven themselves in thepast to be just as capable of violence as the IRA. The consequences of Brexitjust keep on coming.

Tom Arms is a regular contributor to The What & The Why