Ukraine & the Cold Reality of Geopolitics

2014 was supposed to be the year thatchanged everything. After the Euromaidan Revolution and the ouster ofRussia-backed president Viktor Yanukovych, the future of Ukraine seemedbrighter than for a long time.

The West viewed events in Kiev as a triumph for liberal democracy, and its leaders spoke of integrating Ukraine into organizations such as NATO and the European Union. This was music to the ears of many Ukrainians, and some began to dream of replicating the economic growth and rise in living standards experienced by neighbouring Poland. Things moved quickly as agreements were signed, reforms introduced, and EU flags sprang up around the country. Both the West and Ukraine seemed optimistic that the road to Brussels and Washington was clear.

However, things were not so simple. Lostin the euphoria (especially in the West) were the cold, hard realities ofUkraine’s geopolitics. The country acts as a buffer state between the West,Russia, and the Middle East.  Accordingly,the EU, Russia, the United States, China, and Turkey have stakes in the countryand are wary of the others’ intentions. This has left Ukraine in a state ofparalysis as any movement towards one of these actors will lead to a reactionfrom the others.

An examination of the imperatives of themajor players in Ukraine helps explain why each of them monitors events in Kievso closely. Their involvement may ebb and flow, but their long-term strategicinterests help explain why the future direction of the country is uncertain

The EU began the process of reconciliationwith Ukraine shortly after the events in Maidan. Brussels showed its support byfailing to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and levied economicsanctions against the Kremlin because of their involvement in the war ineastern Ukraine. The 2017 Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement includedeconomic and political provisions as well as visa-free access to the EU. Inrecent years, several member states have also voiced support for Ukraine duringits protracted oil and gas transit negotiations with Russia.

In spite of the optimism recent eventssuggest Ukraine is not a top priority for Brussels at present. Already dividedover a multitude of issues, relations with Russia are again causing frictionwithin the bloc. Former Soviet satellites such as Poland and the Baltic statesremain wary of Moscow, but security and economic concerns are pushingheavyweights France and Germany towards rapprochement.

In 2019 French president Emmanuel Macronannounced his “Russia Reset” policy, and backed Russia’s presence at the 2020G20 summit. Across the Rhine, Germany’s export-driven economy is sagging due tofalling demand in places like China as well as the specter of tariffs on keyindustries such as automobiles. Germany and Russia have extensive businessconnections with perhaps the most famous example being the Nord Stream 2pipeline, which carries natural gas directly to Germany under the Baltic Sea.The pipeline is controversial and bypasses Ukraine thus depriving it of much neededtransit fees. Merkel recently visited Putin in Moscow, and Berlin isdesperately looking for new markets for its products. However, overturestowards Russia are viewed with deep suspicion in Kiev.

The E.U. was already at odds with itselfover migration, budgets, and the question of whether to expand or reform thebloc. It may not have the appetite to follow through on the promises of 2014.

Despite its own problems, Russia has fewchoices when it comes to its neighbor. A history of  invasions from the west has resulted instrategic depth being a cornerstone of Russian foreign policy. The idea is thatcountries such as Ukraine serve as buffer states protecting the Russianheartland from attack across the naturally defenseless Northern EuropeanPlains. The buffer once extended all the way to East Germany, but has beenrepeatedly rolled back since the end of the Cold War. Russian anxieties grew asNATO and the E.U. expanded into Poland and the Baltic and the accession ofUkraine into these organizations would be viewed as an existential threat.

This is why the Kremlin will remain anactive participant in Ukraine. Russia is investing in infrastructure to helpconsolidate its control over Crimea, and it is unlikely that the war in easternUkraine will soon end. Moscow will continue to use energy as a weapon againstKiev, which has seen its leverage as a transit hub for Russian energy exportsdiminish thanks to Nord Stream 2 as well as the Turk Stream pipelines.

Further afield others are casting theireyes on Ukraine. The U.S. seems intent on bolstering NATO’s eastern defensiveline wherever possible. It has provided military aid to Ukraine in support ofthe war in the east, but it is debatable how much more it will do. The U.S.already has a sizeable military presence in Poland and Romania, and is wellaware of the fact that any interference in Ukraine will risk a reaction fromRussia. Like the EU, the U.S. is more focused on other foreign policy issuessuch as China, Iran, North Korea, and Syria. As 2020 is an election year, it’ssafe to assume the White House will be largely passive observers in the shortterm.

To the east, China has been using itseconomic clout to expand its sphere of influence throughout Eurasia, and isincreasing investment in European countries. It has been on an infrastructurebuilding spree in places such as Greece, Montenegro, and Hungary, and Ukraineis no exception. China sees Ukraine as a pillar of its Belt and Road Initiativeand is also interested in its agricultural products and military technology.With deep pockets and seemingly limitless ambition, China figures to become anincreasingly important player in Ukraine in the years ahead.

Finally, a newly assertive Turkey has beenflexing its muscles in the Middle East, Mediterranean, and southern Europe. Ona recent trip to Kiev, Turkish president Erdogan pledged some $36 million inmilitary aid to Ukraine, and repeated that Turkey does not recognize Russia’sannexation of Crimea. Turkish construction firms are also winning an everlarger share of contracts in the country, and the two nations share historicalties. Although its footprint in southern Europe remains small compared to theothers, Erdogan’s aspirations for Turkey as well as its close proximity meansit too has long-term interests in Ukraine’s great game.

Six years on from 2014 Ukrainian E.U.membership seems more distant than ever as Brussels. In light of these issues,some have begun wondering whether Ukraine would be better served steering clearof the European integration project. In any case, those in the West who claimedvictory all those years ago were taking a very shortsighted view of things.They took it for granted that Ukraine would be allowed to proceed unimpededinto the Western camp. What they failed to recognize is that Ukraine is andwill continue to be very important to a host of foreign powers. It is aflashpoint where the geopolitical imperatives of many nations cross, converge,and clash. None of these outside players has the right mix of strength and willto dominate Ukraine, and so Kiev continues to exist in a sort of limbo. Unlessthis dynamic changes, Ukraine’s future will continue to be uncertain. This isthe cold reality of geopolitics.

Rob Burger is a Canadian working in Ukraine.